The recognition and compensation of historic injustices is part and parcel of a politics of recognition and of socio-legal attempts of reconciliation and redemption.
United States, or the official apology and the monetary awards extended by the United States government to Japanese Americans illegally interned during World War II. They have also shaped the success of reparation lawsuits against Swiss banks, European insurance companies, and German corporations for harms inflicted in the Nazi past 7 and are being brought into discussions for compensation regarding eugenic practices such as coerced sterilisations, or the forced removal of children. 8 However, compensation and reparation are not synonymous and furthermore, reparation is perhaps best seen as a process rather than an event. The numerous forms of reparations are outlined in detail by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. 9 The paper begins by providing an overview of emerging reparation claims with regards to past practices of coerced sterilisation before mapping eugenic practices and thinking within the concept of bio-politics. After contextualising contemporary reparation claims with a 'genealogy of the present' 10 the next section offers theoretical approaches to justice and reparations. Finally, due to their concurrency developments in Sweden and Switzerland are compared in order to examine similarities and differences in relation to gendered reparation claims and reproductive justice.
MEDIATISATION OF HISTORIC WRONGS
Debates about reparations for eugenic practices, particularly in relation to compensation demands for involuntary sterilisations, have witnessed an upsurge since 7 McCarthy Thomas 'Coming to Terms with our Past: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery ' (2004) 32 Political Theory 750. 8 Although sterilisations and removal of children were qualitatively different in character, with one being a medical technology and the other not, they were both informed by eugenic thinking. Eugenics comprised both negative and positive eugenics, that is, both the thinking and the practices which aimed to prevent unworthy offspring through interventions as well as the thinking and measures which were directive or advisory in character and which aimed at educating the worthy sections of society into appropriate reproductive behaviour. 9 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Human Rights Committee, 56 th meeting, Ch XI, E/CN.4/2005.L.10/Add.11 [BPG] . 10 Visker Rudi Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique Verso London 1995. explicit aims were, in the words of its founding father Alfred Siegfried, to prevent the Jenisch from 'reproducing without restraints and bringing new generations of degenerate and abnormal children into the world '. 17 Swiss eugenic history was not new to social historians as a number of studies since the early 1990s attest to. 18 But following the 'Nazi Gold' scandal, which had revealed that Swiss banks profiteered from Nazi crimes, it further shook the foundations of Swiss identity, in particular, its (self-) image as a neutral nation driven by humanitarian aims and social justice. Furthermore, it exposed a nation, whose political institutions of direct democracy and federalism were devised to allow for the expression and protection of cultural 'differences' within its borders, to have behaved discriminatory and damagingly towards particular groups, thereby contributing to their continuous marginalisation. Different reactions to national pasts, such as Sweden, which was quick to launch a process of compensation following apologies from the then Swedish government, suggest the necessity to consider issues of redress and reconciliation in relation to eugenic pasts. Switzerland, by contrast, decided not to adopt legislation for compensation in December 2004. 19 In the U.S. meanwhile, a 'discursive architecture of apologies' 20 has been mounted in relation to involuntary sterilisations, with state governors of Virginia, Oregon, North Carolina, South Carolina, and California apologising for past practices since 2002. In the following, I will outline briefly the context of eugenics and involuntary sterilisation before examining a number of reparation claims juxtaposing the Swedish and the Swiss case. Eugenics was hugely influential in modernising societies in its many different forms since the late nineteenth century and is seen to have constituted a mainstream body of thinking across Western nations, which constituted themselves through a 'quest for order '. 21 Underpinned by science and reason, modernising nations sought to create and maintain social and political order, no longer seen as natural, through the design, engineering and management of existence. In that pursuit, eugenics offered not just a scientific analysis of existing social problems but also strategies to solve these problems presented in the name of rationality and targeted the regulation of the population's reproductive sexuality. 22 Within discourses about threats to the nation's health, sexuality and gender, in conjunction with particular ideas about physical and mental abilities, came to constitute an axis of intervention. On these premises, eugenics became an approach and a tool to rationalise the management of the population's health, especially through the governance of reproductive sexuality, particularly women's sexuality. Many of the discussions focus on the differences between voluntary and forced sterilisation and the legal basis for either or both, yet relatively little is said about the fact that these did not constitute two ends of a continuum. 23 Indeed, as both the Swiss and the Swedish case show, voluntariness to consent was upheld as a principle even though actual practices point clearly to pressures and/or threats under which consent was given. In addition, a closer look at the contexts of sterilisations reveals that they were often embedded in a As for the legality of sterilisation, Sweden had two national laws (from 1934 and 1941) 25 whereas in Switzerland, only the regional jurisdiction (Vaud) had a law on sterilisation from 1928 until 1985, with Bern having a directive (in 1931) . 26 The Vaudois law, however, served to effectively curtail eugenicists' efforts to apply the law more widely, and sterilisation practices have been more prevalent in localities where psychiatrists were left to their own devices. 27 Criminal Law provisions were highly contested among psychiatrists who mostly preferred making more use of Civil Law legislation, which ultimately proved more useful to psychiatrists in maintaining their role as gatekeepers of reproductive sexuality. The absence of a specific legal framework has, however, particular ramifications for contemporary reparation claims, as I will show later.
EUGENIC UPTOPIA AND BIOPOLITICS
Eugenic practices were directed at changing the trajectory of the perceived dysgenic future and create instead a utopian future society. As such, the idea of prevention is crucial to eugenics while at the same time, the effects of eugenic thinking and practices were always firmly located in the future, that is, present day society. Eugenics was thus always imbued with a temporal dimension, so that questions of time, that is, the relationship between past, present and future is by no means crossed for the first time by contemporary reparation claims. Foucault has compellingly shown throughout his work that genealogy is important to our conceptualisation of the contemporary world when he made a general and conceptual argument about the role of history in the present. 28 The interest here is not in how eugenics' legacy is being reconfigured, 25 Enligt lagen (1934: 171) and Enligt Lagen (1941: 282) continued and discontinued in contemporary genetic politics, but in examining how the history of eugenics is a history of the present for several reasons. 29 Thus, in addition to eugenics' own ideas about future, various contemporary judicial institutions are dealing with claims relating to eugenics, which makes it a present socio-political dilemma. That is, eugenics does, by means of invoking calls for reparation and therefore law as a mechanism of regulatory power, impact on contemporary politics and thus has a complex temporal impact.
Thus, in calls for reparation, the utopias of history form a central temporal axis. Before examining the gender-specific historic injustices around coerced sterilisations, it is helpful to outline some of the work on reparation and transitional justice and deal with its principles and strategies for implementation. 30 
JUSTICE AND REPARATIONS
Redressing past wrongs is seen as essential to establishing conditions of justice in societies scarred by the enduring and pervasive effects of those wrongs. This is particularly pertinent where perpetrators of those wrongs include continuing corporate agents in the broad sense of bodies recognised in law as incorporated, such as states, firms, and other public and private institutions, such as welfare agencies or psychiatric units, and when those affected are large groups of individuals who were harmed precisely as members of a specific group, such as the mentally deficient or anormals. The ultimate aim is to involve national governments in redressing the legacy of injustice through legislation but also through court proceedings.
Based on the principles of corrective or rectificatory justice, and in as much as it is practically possible and morally permissible, the correction of a legacy of past injustices is thought to be a moral-political requirement for enduring corporate agents, such as states. The principle of collective responsibility emerges from ideas about collective citizenship in that each generation of citizens not only inherits the rights of membership, although critical theorists have long pointed to the fact that citizenship rights have not been bestowed equally upon members, but also that each generation inherits the burdens of membership. National debts, be they financial or cultural, accrue to the political community as a whole either because they were state sanctioned and implemented or because state members collectively benefited so that by the same logic they ought to share inherited liabilities. 31 The aim of corrective justice is not to relegate dealings with past injustices to the realm of guilt but to see collective responsibility as an element of a more complex narrative within 'the history of a relationship '. 32 Embedded in that notion is the perception that material reparations are not the only or primary form of reparation and that symbolic measures can be equally effective, consisting of public acknowledgement and public apologies, times and places of official commemoration, museums and exhibitions, revised textbooks and curricula, a strengthening of civic trust and solidarity and so on.
Discourses on reconciliation warn against perceiving restoration as the object of reparative justice, but are also wary of the tendency to devolve into 'justice as the demands of the victim'. 33 While the depths of the body of literature on reparative justice is beyond the purposes of this article, the elements it does wish to dwell on are the two forms of reparation alluded to above, that is, material and symbolic forms of reparation for past injustices in the context of eugenics.
Similarly this article does not seek to undertake a comprehensive theorizing or reviewing of feminist transitional justice but I want to, nevertheless, draw out several violations that women experience. 38 O'Rourke also develops a notion of gendered harm which draws attention to the connection of (legally recognized) gendered harm and (non-legally-recognized) gender regimes and normativities existing within societies.
She uses the notion of 'web of gender-based harms' 39 to point to the interconnection of both the harm experienced during conflict and the effects of gender regimes in pre and post conflict society while Rubio-Marín draws a similar connection by examining gender based harm within the long transition from pre to post conflict society. 40 What is important to draw out here is that the harms experienced by women -when they are sexual and reproductive harms -continue to have an impact on women's experiences by framing their perceptions and status within their communities as 'spoiled identity'. 41 Sexual and reproductive violence is typically accompanied by 'social and symbolic multipliers of harm', 42 in the form of stigma, ostracism, and rejection by actual or potential partners and family members. Through these social effects the 'original violation is extended, ramified, and augmented in multiple ways that significantly alter the women's physical safety and well-being, social reintegration and status, economic survival, and eligibility for marriage '. 43 Reproductive violations are therefore continuous violations with both primary reproductive violation as well as consequent reactions from surrounding people and communities. 44 Such reactions add to the negative experience and not only comprehensively render victims stained or spoiled but also devalued. Drawing on Goffman's stigmatization works by comprehensively 'spoiling identities' which separates the stigmatized person from society and from herself through a process 44 The reproductive violations involved in coerced sterilisations have been shown to have been linked to other practices such as granting abortions upon consenting to sterilisations, or the receipt of a marriage licence only upon agreeing to a sterilisation. whereby the person is perceived as less than human, or not as worthy as others. Read against the backdrop of normative constructions of women and femininity through marriage and even more so motherhood, 45 the idea of spoiled identity has particular pertinence to women whose reproductive abilities have been curtailed resulting in various forms of stigma management for the person. 46 While for those affected by historic sterilisation practices this may lie in the past, it is important to acknowledge the enduring effects of both primary and secondary violations that have occurred.
RECONCILIATING EUGENIC PASTS
Coming to terms with eugenic pasts has resulted in a number of politico-legal struggles, which have sought to reconcile coerced sterilisations. A number of US states, such as Virginia (2002), Oregon (2002 ), North Carolina (2002 and California (2003) 47 have produced apologies for their sterilisation practices which have been interpreted as the acceptance of some form of accountability for past eugenic policies and measures. 48 Redress in the form of financial compensation, however, arrived only a decade later in North Carolina (2013) 49 and Virginia (2015) . 50 Swedish government was swift in its response to the public reaction and set up a state commission to atone for the perceived atrocities and established that those sterilized without their consent should receive reparations. 54 The report asserted that 31,000 people were estimated to have been voluntarily sterilized. 6,000 sterilisations (ca. 10%) happened with explicit force, and 15,000 people (ca. 25%) had signed the application though many of these did so in order to be allowed an abortion or be released from an institution. 55 In a further 6000 cases (ca. 10%) there were also signs of persuasion or pressure and the remaining 4,000 cases (ca. 7%) could not be determined. 56 93% of them were women which thus pointed to gendered aspects of eugenic administration. 57 Crucially, the report proposed that where women were 'probably' sterilised against their will, they should be awarded compensation and where the sterilisation was voluntary (since 1976) there was to be no compensation. By 2001, 2300 applications had been received and 1600 were successful, receiving an identical sum of 175,000 Swedish crowns (approx. Dollars 25,000). 58 55 Many were performed during abortions, as mandatory before release from prisons or psychiatric wards, to qualify for public assistance or to avoid losing custody of children (Regeringens skrivelse 2000) . Runcis (1998) argued that the original motivation to cleanse society of the feebleminded broadened into a willingness to sterilise for socially or morally offensive behaviour. Local committees, with significant variations in implementation of the laws, sometimes chose to recommend or impose sterilisation of gypsies, women who could not provide for numerous children, or sexually promiscuous women. 56 It is a symbolic gesture to make up for past wrongs. The laws between 1941 and 1975 said that sterilisations must be voluntary, but we know that many people were sterilised against their will. 59
However, while the Swedish decision of 1999 to compensate those affected by past eugenic practices was productive of a discourse (both political and mass media) about the history of sterilisations elsewhere, Lene Koch has also argued that the motivation behind this was more a historiography of indignation rather than a historiography of eugenics. In other words, while Sweden's public sphere was almost unanimously agreed on the need to compensate it saw less of a need to search for a thorough reconstruction of the past. An imperative to produce further historical studies on 66 This social change in attitudes, the Federal Council stipulated, could not only be seen in relation to disabled people's rights to sexuality but also in changing legislation on welfare measures such as administrative internment.
After a lengthy parliamentary debate, the rejection of a compensation scheme in cases of involuntary sterilisation centred around three key areas of contestation. First, the absence of a national legal framework on sterilisation which was argued to affect the legal responsibility of the government. Recurrence to existing provisions for compensation in cases of criminal injury (Victims Compensation Law, Opferhilfegesetz OHG, 1991) were thought to be non-applicable as none of the sterilisations had violated a criminal code and were therefore illegal. Second, it was argued that in the absence of national legislation and the fact that welfare administration was a cantonal matter and the federal government neither could nor should be held accountable. Furthermore, ascertaining with clarity whether sterilisations were fulfilling the condition of 'coercion' was deemed to be 'extremely difficult' hindering therefore a proper assessment of potential applications. In addition, it was thought that the extent of the problem was unclear due to incomplete historical research:
It can be concluded from the commission report that sterilisations, which took place without informed consent, were based on different situations and practices according to each canton, physician and institution. The boundary between interventions which were evidently based on illegal coercion and whose legitimacy remains controversial today is fluid. 67 Third, it was feared that a 'dangerous precedent' would be set by installing a compensation scheme which would lead to other reconciliatory demands for past injustices and incur costs, such as in the case of administrative internments and Contract Children before the 1980s. 68 It was also argued that this would 'create 67 Stellungnahme Bundesrat 2003 as above at 6357. 68 Swiss welfare authorities had a range of measures at their disposal to deal with families perceived to be poor or unruly which have come to the attention of the media, the public and politicians since the late 1990s and which have some 20 years later resulted in the Reparation Initiative (Wiedergutmachungsinitiative) submitted in December 2014. One of these was the practice of contracting children from poor families out to farmers or placing them in families where they were often subjected to hardship and more. 
Avoiding Precedents, Avoiding National Responsibility
The Federal Council and the majority of Parliament were strongly driven by legal questions and argued that neither the Victims Compensation Law (OHG) 73 could be 69 It was argued that past events should not be judged by present ethical standards which would only do injustice to those individuals who, at the time, acted in the interest of society and on the basis of prevalent social norms. 70 However, reparation (as symbolic and material gesture) had been established previously with the compensations programme for the victims of the 'Children of the Country Road' program, a privately initiated but state supported program which systematically removed children from Yeniche families to place them in residential or foster care. 76 That reparation debate resulted in the establishment of a Foundation, which was to issue 'solidarity payments', and thus equally avoided the principle of compensation entitlement. 77 This reparation process, however, was felt by victims to lack proper satisfaction and rehabilitation both in the decision not to install a principle of compensation, in the administration of the solidarity payments and in the political avoidance of public acknowledgment and recognition. 78 The position paper on coerced sterilisations recognized the principle of 'recognition owed' but at the same time tried to avert additional financial obligation: 79 We would not want to diminish the personal trajectories resulting from practices that today would be considered inacceptable. But these practices have to be contemplated in the context of a continuously developing society in which we learn from mistakes and injustices of the past. The recognition which society owes 74 Administrative internment (administrative Versorgung) was a means of effecting imprisonment on the basis of the Swiss Civil Code of 1912 rather than through criminal law which had led to widespread abuses of the system in the early parts of the twentieth century, such as in cases of Contract Children. 75 The continuous attempts to compensate referred, once again, to the Pro Juventute practice and the 'Children of the Country Roads' compensation but also to the case of haemophiliacs where responsibility was acknowledged. 81 The phrasing suggests that, contrary to the professed recognition owed, there was actually a strong resentment towards the idea of atonement or making amends for past injustices and an attempt to contextualise, perhaps even hide away, support for people within existing welfare structures. In its argumentation, the position paper also implicitly rejected the notion that victims of coerced sterilisations might have undergone two forms of injury: the coerced sterilisation itself as well as the ensuing stigmatization and management of a spoiled identity. Furthermore, it assumes a contemporary notion of mental ability to those affected when historical work comprehensively shows that mental deficiencies were in fact enmeshed with various marginalized identities.
The reluctance to engage with ideas of responsibility is, I argue, a third form of injury using the idea of reproductive violence within the life trajectory of affected women: in addition to reproductive injur(ies) and the ensuing marked life as a woman without children the rejection of reparation mechanisms constitutes an injury of the present. acknowledged, the parliamentary discussions were so occupied with establishing whether or not legal responsibility existed there was never any proposal of an official apology.
Unpacking Responsibility
Any form of collective responsibility, the Federal Council held, was to be placed at local government level if parliament nevertheless decided on financial retribution, although not so much in legal terms but in social and political terms. This bears an inherent inconsistency in that the collective is both made and unmade as the bearers of responsibility. If the physicians, welfare administrators, priests and other individuals involved in welfare practices and decision making processes should not be personally held responsible because they acted according to social norms one would assume that the bigger national bio-social collective bears past and present responsibility. In other words, if these practices were part of a wider regime of care and prevention in the name of the collective then responsibility for breach of care also lay with the collective, in this case the national collective. But the Federal Council took the decision, as did the majority of parliament later, that responsibility needed to be defined more narrowly:
It is precisely unproven in the case at hand, and in contrast to the programme 'Children of the Country Roads', that the Federal Government morally, politically or financially supported forced sterilisation, which have been practiced by certain physicians and institutions. 82 If responsibility towards the past existed at all then it had to be laid, as did welfare administration, with cantonal governments. This argument effaced that it was a national political decision in the first place that welfare support was denominated to be a local responsibility -cantonal and communal -and that a responsibility or a burden towards the past remains incurred. It was a national-political decision not to include a national regulation on sterilisation in the criminal law, which was being nationalised between 1890s and 1930s and enacted in 1942. Moreover, if national legislation would have had the effect, as did the Vaudois law, 83 to curb numbers of sterilisation then in fact national responsibility could even more strongly be framed in terms of not intervening. Furthermore, the Swiss government did implicitly sanction sterilisations as part of population politics through the government's position on the family article 1944, for instance. Although eugenic arguments were discarded at the last minute from the family protection rationale the Federal Councillor Philipp Etter argued that it was not necessary to include it as such a politics could be carried out in Switzerland without constitutional basis. 84 Federal government supported eugenic goals and also never spoke against them, as members of parliament and social historians have pointed out during the discussions. 85 Interestingly, the historical commission challenging the previously national narrative of neutrality of Switzerland during WWII which was prompted by the Nazi-Gold scandal also concluded that 'collective responsibility by the state' can be defined not just by the state's actions but, crucially, by lack of action. 86 This creates, it could be argued, a much more complex premise for the attempt to relate past (legal) conditions to present responsibility yet a legalistic interpretation of the separation of past and present prevailed. Rather than using the idea of a 'critical genealogy of the present', 87 the attempt to establish whether past law, social norms and welfare practices are the principal framing of the reparation question also obscured that reparation is fundamentally attached to the present, or as Schürer argues, reparation is a problem of the present and it is a process of recognition which inevitably incurs recognising a different history and a rupture with those who had been seen as good citizens. The responsibility for the victims of the past is a question of the present. Past injury cannot be reversed. The victims of then, however, can be rejected again.
What is at stake is thus less the past practices towards those affected than present practices. 89 In December 2004, a Reparation Bill for coerced sterilisations was rejected driven by centre and right parties who thought it wrong 'to judge the past according to today's measures and knowledge [and] to map our conception of law onto incidents which occurred in different time and under different conditions'. 90 In contrast, social democrats and greens argued for a need to acknowledge past injustices and saw it neither as a shame nor a misjudgment to retrospectively deem certain practices to be illegal and victimising. Furthermore, they contested that there was an absence of regulation and pointed out that physicians were aware of the need to obtain legally valid consent as otherwise they could be brought to justice for grievous bodily harm, though the question might be raised whether marginalised people can ever do that.
Left parties emphasised that the mere absence of sentences for committing grievous bodily harm in the form of sterilisations was not indicative of their practice or its contestation. 91 The position of the Federal Council, they argued, was seen to 'lack a sense of history', to be 'constitutionally insensitive and insufficient' and to constitute a The Swiss response to compensation claims for coerced sterilisations can only be described as a legalistic approach to a gendered historic injustice claim, and defended by lawyer-politicians who made up the steering commission during a period marked by a strong populism in politics and media coverage. The puzzle as to how to litigate past wrongs dominated over considerations of transformed historical sensibility, human rights, duties of care or the roles and responsibility of the democratic state. The key concepts were compensation and indemnity rather than, as has been the case in other contexts such as South Africa, reparation and reconciliation. Although the term reparation entered the political discussion in Switzerland it was pragmatically used to pursue compensation claims rather than being at the basis of a discussion about collective responsibility which could lead to wider acknowledgment and a public apology.
Crucially, it concerned a claim affecting predominantly women (unlike the removal of Jenisch children which had previously undergone a recognition struggle and since then the Contract Children which are currently undergoing a recognition struggle). 105 Eugenics can be seen as a utopia with an explicit temporal vision aiming to improve the gene pool of the national collective. The body of thinking and practices emanating from it had a clear future beneficiary, that is, present and future societies. For those trying to clearly separate the past from the present, this is an uncomfortable element and one which incurs a responsibility to present day society. In missing a (first) opportunity at partial restoration, the rejection of either material or symbolic forms of restitution constitute a rejection of recognising gendered welfare injustices and, as Thompson proposes, unremembered, unacknowledged and un-redresssed historical injustice cannot help but demoralise the common life of a nation. 106 This is perhaps particularly pertinent to a nation that was reluctant to provide women with basic political rights. 107 The recognition and compensation of individual injustices is part and parcel of a politics of recognition and reconciliation and redemption, at least in gesture. In terms of being a question of national belonging and citizenship, collective acknowledgment and reconciliation struggles ought not to depend merely on the size and prevalence of discriminatory practices but also of their symbolic value. In this sense, reconciliation debates raise questions about democracies and their understanding of inherited burdens and rights and about whose reparation claims get heard -and succeed -while providing opportunity for collective reflexivity in late modernity about the relationship of the present to our past.
It is, perhaps, worth to return to Nancy Fraser's seminal thinking on the quest for justice and her different ways of conceptualizing such undertakings. 108 The dilemmas of justice in what she calls a post-Westphalian world must explicitly come to terms with the central political questions of the who: whose interests count, who decides who counts, whose voices get heard, who is included among the decision-makers, to whom we have duties, and so on. 109 These bare questions have much bearing on ideas and practices of reparation even though, having expanded her conceptual framework from recognition and redistribution to include questions of representation, Fraser's characterization of 'abnormal justice' is much more focused on justice in relation to changing and challenging spatialities, rather than about justice in relation to temporalities. 110 Adding the dimension of time and past injustices, and alongside that, 110 In relation to historic injustices by colonialist regimes and imperial ventures Fraser's work has been taken to be useful in asking questions about the usefulness of representation and frame-setting at the time yet overriding this is the actual exploitation and violation of the colonial and imperial subject population, making it thereby a question of redistribution. Thus, while Fraser undertakes a rethinking of a critical 'genealogy of the present' 111 has framed the arguments of this paper.
An attempt to answer Fraser's numerous who questions yields some gendered answers, and different jurisdictions have had different versions of answering these. Feminist transitional justice approaches have already revealed the ways in which 'webs of gendered harm' have had a more difficult stand in reparation claims. 112 Acknowledging the historic injustices of coerced sterilisations has been a shorter process in Sweden than elsewhere, not surprising perhaps given its general perspective of gender and gender equality. Switzerland's political engagement, by contrast, was more dismissive of reparation yet has found itself having to deal with reparation questions more as a result of having to embark on a much longer and wider framed social and public debate on coerced welfare measures.
The initial Swiss political framing of the reparation claim resulted in an overly legalistic approach making recourse to the (non) applicability of international law and human rights to past practices. The current attempt at reparation has, by contrast, had a wider reception by both media and the public, and has been driven by people who have been affected by past coercive welfare measures. But in addition, it is happening against the backdrop of the attempt of the previous decade which despite its lack of success perhaps provided a necessary discursive platform for an eventual success. A Swiss law on reparation for coercive welfare measures looks likely to pass in one form or another in 2016 which is billed to have coerced sterilisations included. 113 Those welfare practices that were explicitly gendered are now subsumed within a larger catalogue of coerced welfare measures. The current situation is much more hopeful with regards to arriving at financial compensation within the next few years, a critical democratic theory of justice and continuously asks questions about the borders and boundaries (and their relevance) of nations, jurisdictions and responsibilities, this question is never expanded, or so it seems, to ask whether this is not merely about spatiality and geographies but also about time and temporalities. 111 
